eqvinox 26 minutes ago

Anyone know if "-cpu ${CPU},vmx=off,svm=off" in QEMU is a safe workaround for this?

(To disable nested virtualization on a per-VM basis. Only against exploitation from within that specific VM, obviously does nothing against users with access to /dev/kvm on the host.)

[That did work around Januscape: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48815819]

minimaltom 11 hours ago

Oh yay another one lol. This one seems much more general than the prior one that needed nested page tables.

Patch Thursday for cloud VM ppl lol

  • metadat 11 hours ago

    Do most cloud providers have live-migration or what is the approach to make this seamless? What kind of interruption might tenants notice?

    • cudder 11 hours ago

      It depends. If you have a plain old VM with no GPU and networked storage it's easy to migrate. If you're using low latency HW on the host it gets a lot trickier. Kuberenetes or some other fleet management helps there, you spin up new nodes and drain the old ones as capacity allows. If you have your PodDisruptionBudgets set right you won't notice much.

      You can also use ksplice to live patch the vulnerable kernels as a first aid. I'm not an expert but I think there are some limits to what you can accomplish with it. Also guessing that the embargo period allows the big names to roll the patches out gradually enough that you won't see any panic shutdowns.

    • minimaltom 8 hours ago

      Yeah most cloud providers have live migration and a reasonably-well-tested playbook for updating the node kernel + hypervisor.

  • tryauuum 9 hours ago

    Doesn't this one need it as well? I see the shadow mmu

    • minimaltom 8 hours ago

      Right, but what x86 KVM setup is there in practice that doesnt present a mmu to its guest and hence keep its own track (shadow) of memory mappings?

      • Veserv 7 hours ago

        Shadow memory mappings are only needed when you do not have hardware virtualization or when doing nested virtualization.

        From the page: "it can threaten the guest-host isolation of KVM/x86 hosts that accept untrusted guests and expose nested virtualization"

        That is not to say that it is not a serious vulnerability though.

  • esjeon 2 hours ago

    This one exploit "shadow MMU" in the nested virtualization path of KVM, so this one is more-limited than EPT/NPT vul'n (KVM defaults to EPT/NPT, nested virt'n is disabled by default).

    Nested virtualization is rather a niche feature, and, tbh, considering that shadow MMU is highly complicated legacy code (i.e. outside of the main happy path) and has been source of critical vul'n, I would avoid nested virtualization on KVM.

rvz 12 hours ago

Another serious critical vulnerability that almost no-one cares about, when they should.