by 125ajh 2 days ago

You got that right. In this thread we have a ClosedAI employee promoting ClosedID services. Look at the sponsors of ClosedID:

https://openid.net/foundation/sponsoring-members/

We know why PyPI ripped out PGP support and has refused any verification mechanisms that other distributions use for decades.

cozzyd 2 days ago

I trust myself way more to with with a pgp key on my computer than figuring out how to use GitHub actions properly...

  • theteapot 2 days ago

    The problem is no one else does. Github workflow is at least public and auditable. Your personal computer is not.

    • pdonis 2 days ago

      So what? Ultimately the trust model is supposed to be there to validate that this latest blob of code is coming from the same source as the last blob of code for the same project, authenticated with the same public key. And that's all it is telling you, and all that it can tell you, whether the attestation is generated during a Github workflow or by a program running on my personal computer that you can't see. It is not telling you that this latest blob of code is safe and free from problems. It's just telling you that it comes from the same source.

      • akerl_ 2 days ago

        The average person using GPG isn’t actually providing me much evidence in that regard, given the number of ways to have technically used a GPG key to sign an artifact that aren’t secure.

        • pdonis 2 days ago

          That's easy to handle: if the signature isn't secure, it doesn't count as an attestation. I have no problem with putting the onus on the person doing the signing to do it right. But at present doing it right on your own is not even an option. Only going through one of the tech giants is.

          • akerl_ 2 days ago

            How is PyPI supposed to tell if the person signing the artifacts is handling their key securely?

            • pdonis 2 days ago

              They can't. But they can't tell for sure if large tech corporations are doing that either. Data breaches are a thing. Auditing Github workflows doesn't prevent them.

              • cozzyd 2 days ago

                Microsoft can't even figure out how to send email reliably. But sure everyone should trust them with signing packages.

              • akerl_ 1 day ago

                These aren't really comparable things.

                The fact that a large company can mess things up doesn't change the fact that it's way more viable to review how Github or Gitlab or Codeberg handles key material and security than it is to make a comparable local developer flow that avoids common mistakes like just dropping the signing key on disk on whatever servers you want to run your builds from.

                • pdonis 1 day ago

                  > it's way more viable to review how Github or Gitlab or Codeberg handles key material and security

                  Only if you already trust them.

                  > dropping the signing key on disk on whatever servers you want to run your builds from

                  I run my builds on my local machine. The private key I would use to sign them if PyPI supported that is not anywhere in the repo I'm using.

                  Of course you would have to trust that I'm telling the truth in what I just said. But, as above, you also need to trust what the large tech forges are telling you in order to review how they handle their keys.

            • tsuraan 1 day ago

              If the PGP key was generated on a yubikey, then the owner of the key can generate and publish an attestation certificate[0][1], and then anybody (including PyPI, I assume) can verify and "gold star" artifacts signed by gpg keys with verified attestations. Pulling a private key off a yubikey isn't super easy, at least not that I know of. Maybe other hardware keys can do similar things?

              Seems more straightforward than custom stuff built on OIDC, but I'm not a security guy, so maybe I'm missing something?

              [0] - https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/Attestation.html [1] - https://docs.yubico.com/software/yubikey/tools/ykman/OpenPGP...

              • akerl_ 1 day ago

                One missing bit of context here might be that PyPI used to support GPG signing your packages and barely anybody did it. And that’s not even with trying to push for hardware keys to limit user ability to make a mistake.

                You can also look to FIDO2 / passkeys to see that a lot of the folks who have concerns about PyPI trusted publishing also view device attestation as a scourge.

      • UltraSane 1 day ago

        Every private key not created inside a HSM should be assumed to be compromised.

    • usr1106 1 day ago

      Github workflow public and audible?

      The repos workflow source, yes.

      But the workflow engine implementation? I don't know how much of it is open source, but I am sure nobody external can audit what Microsoft really runs there. Another company starting with M has just been fined for accessing users' photos. So I would not be 100% surprised if Microsoft changed/amended some user code before executing it or interpreted it in an unpublished way e. g. "for security reasons"

bbor 2 days ago

1. "ClosedAI" is not gonna win people over to your side, IMHO. Apple doesn't plant trees, Microsoft makes big hardware, and Python is not satanic.

2. I'm not entirely sure what the link is supposed to prove -- would appreciate a word of clarification if you find the time. It almost feels like a dogwhistle of some kind, but A) I doubt anyone on HN is anywhere near that problematic, and B) there's no clear pattern in those companies other than "interested in ID tech", and none of the usual dogwhistle targets made the list. Also, y'know, OpenAI isn't on it...?

I guess my fundamental confusion isn't about the list and more about what "we know". Are you implying that they are against pure, unmanaged PGP for this system because... I mean, why? Because they're playing the long game to promote a verification/attestation/identification (?) technology that you think offers less stringent privacy guarantees, and thus to sell more ads in 2036?

If so, doesn't that seem like a kinda roundabout way to raise Display Ads revenue, otherwise known as "that one dying industry"?