Show HN: Nobody blocks a keyboard – Rooted Android as a physical USB Deck

github.com

53 points by mr-anjaneyam 2 days ago

Hey HN, I built Emittr because, i frequently deal with air-gapped or locked-down systems where USB storage is disabled and third party software cannot be installed. Nobody blocks a physical keyboard, so i used the Linux Kernel's USB gadget subsystem (ConfigFS at /dev/hidg0) to turn a rooted android phone to a real USB HID Keyboard and mouse. 1. No installation on target device. It talks to motherboard USB controller, so it works in every locked down OS as well, BIOS, GRUB, etc. 2. Out of band bridge : we don't store passwords or authenticators on rooted phone. Emittr exposes a web UI on LAN, so we can send keystrokes from our main phones. 3. Types long scripts (chatgpt debuggings), SSH keys or passwords at ~1000 WPM without touching the host's clipboard. 4. OS can see this only as a genuine HID keyboard/mouse. Zero host footprint as no drivers, software or background scripts on target machine. 5. Uses USB-IF 0x0238 via on-screen joysticks instead of synthetic Shift + Scroll hacks.

Feel free to check the work and try if you have a rooted android handy. GitHub: https://github.com/mr-anjaneyam/Emittr Webpage: https://emittr.srianjaneyam.me/

I'm planning to record and add few demos in various scenarios (Windows, macOS, android, linux, bios) and devices (Phone, PC, TV, STB, Kiosk).

Happy to answer any questions and would love to hear your suggestions, feature ideas or edge cases.

jasode 7 hours ago

>, so it works in every locked down OS as well, BIOS, GRUB, etc.

Fyi... Apple MacBook laptops and iPhones block USB peripherals (including keyboards) unless the password is first entered on the real builtin keyboard or touchscreen to approve it.

Supposedly, Apple does this to prevent gadgets like yours from brute-forcing passwords.

  • mr-anjaneyam 6 hours ago

    Yes, absolutely. Apple has these protections for a good reason. But Emittr is primarly intended for systems we own/authorized to manage. I see it more as a feature-rich, programmable super keyboard than a bypass tool

  • evandrofisico 5 hours ago

    Yep, I do this on my notebook, not loading USB peripherals until the luks partition is unlocked.

arde 7 hours ago

Now, if it could also use the camera to forward video it would turn into a full KVM-over-IP. Or it could parse the camera input for text output or automation. Or it could use STT for its input, so it would enable easy verbal interaction with any device.

  • mr-anjaneyam 6 hours ago

    Interesting directions! Camera + HID would be really an exciting combination. imagine having both visual feedback and input control without installing anything on the target machine. STT idea is also worth exploring!

GuB-42 7 hours ago

So, it essentially turns the phone into a "BadUSB" device.

I wanted to do this with a Flipper Zero on a locked-down system but I refrained, a keyboard firing a script at 1000 WPM really looks like an attack, and I don't want to do something that looks like an attack on a system that is not mine.

It doesn't mean it is not useful, in fact, it may be too useful, that's the problem...

  • ray_v 5 hours ago

    I did this over the weekend with Claude. My Flipper Zero was paired to my tablet as a Bluetooth HID keyboard ... Claude wrote a custom app for the Flipper that acted like the keyboard, with human-like timing between keystrokes. Claude called the device over RPC on USB, through a small HTTP daemon it also wrote, so anything on my network could send text to type. This was a few hours worth of effort. Wild times.

atmanactive 2 days ago

While we're on the subject, for non-rooted phones, I can recommend InputStick.

  • mr-anjaneyam 1 day ago

    Yes. Thanks for the suggestion. It is a readymade hardware, pretty easy to use. My app's motive is to repurpose.

_Microft 1 day ago

And is that really a good idea? These systems might be airgapped for good reason.

  • mr-anjaneyam 14 hours ago

    This doesn't break the containment. This comes handy when it's needed to type some complex scripts chatgpt gives to debug. once our work is done, we can plug out to respect the airgap

    • thereader12 7 hours ago

      I mean entering a complex script from an ai very well may introduce a virus that otherwise wouldn't be possible. And if the android can connect to the internet, then hasn't containment been broken?

      • mr-anjaneyam 6 hours ago

        This can type script to the machine, if the machine is offline then any curl type commands will definitely fail. By complex scripts - i meant lengthy or not typing friendly scripts

        • HeWhoLurksLate 5 hours ago

          you can also get an okay bitrate back out again if you combine toggling num lock, screen lock, and caps lock (and googling it, compose and kana gets you to 5 bits)

    • VikingCoder 5 hours ago

      I actually can't imagine how you can say it doesn't break containment.

      Of course it does.

      • alhadrad 3 hours ago

        Its wildly unethical.

    • clickety_clack 4 hours ago

      Did the people that built the containment approve the device?

gunalx 2 hours ago

Dosent this defeat the entire point of the airgap? I know the pain but still.

yjftsjthsd-h 5 hours ago

> Out of band bridge : we don't store passwords or authenticators on rooted phone. Emittr exposes a web UI on LAN, so we can send keystrokes from our main phones.

Depending on threat model (do you trust the network?), that seems less secure than keeping credentials on-device.

lefra 7 hours ago

If I went to the extreme of air-gapping a machine, I'd make sure that anyone trying to plug a phone to it gets fired on the spot.

  • recursive-call 7 hours ago

    This. One of the main selling points being that a security audit won't catch your usage of the device really makes this whole thing feel shady. I'm sure spies will love it.

    • djriley 6 hours ago

      That sort of felt like the whole purpose to me. First thing I did after reading the README is looked up how to lock USB down completely. Looks like USBGuard is the best way to do this on Linux, it allows you to inspect attributes and pin devices to a specific port.

      This is shady. It's also an issue a lot of people may not be aware of. It's best to call attention to holes lest someone fall in one. Anyone maintaining a serious air-gapped system should already be strictly controlling who has physical access to the machine. But there are a lot of less serious but very vulnerable targets that admins would be wise to consider this sort of thing. Retail displays, road signs, kiosks, etc.

      Just because trespassing is a crime doesn't mean it's still not wise to lock your doors.

    • mr-anjaneyam 6 hours ago

      If they are already collecting data from input devices somehow, from laptop's keyboard or attached one, they can see keystrokes from this USB device too. (I tried a software keylogger to test, but it prioritized internal keyboard only)

  • leonidasrup 6 hours ago

    I have seen computers in some air-gapped high security areas where all USB ports were physically disabled - filled with glue. Of course there were very strict rules about not bringing in any kind of unregistered electronic devices (also any dangerous objects, knives or even screwdrivers) and entries to this facilities were controlled by security personnel with metal detectors.

    • mr-anjaneyam 6 hours ago

      These scenarios can be an exception. air-gapped can either be for system safety (like in internal server rooms) or high security areas where it's reasonable

    • 0cf8612b2e1e 6 hours ago

      Does anyone still make PS/2 peripherals just for high security areas?

      • mr-anjaneyam 6 hours ago

        Would be funny if PS/2 ended up being the last trusted interface in these environments :)

        • tosapple 3 hours ago

          i've casually stockpiled ps2 kbs for a while, goodwill is a decent source that technically can't be interdicted.

          they made optical mice during the ps2 era too but i'm unsure about the resolution.

          there are also usb-to-serial and usb-to-irda adapters.

          the usb-to-irda may be convertible to visible light freqs via basic soldering.

          palmos and windowsce hardware devices may be sufficiently early enough to not suffer from arm trustzone and intel amt | me or amd psp.

  • mr-anjaneyam 6 hours ago

    Some like me feel using their own mechanical keyboard. Our phone can wear a mask of keyboard if connected :) I wonder how can you classify a legitimate keyboard vs a legitimated keyboard.

    • mkesper 4 hours ago

      By only allow registered USB IDs?

      • fn-mote 10 minutes ago

        No, you can lie about that, too.

        It’s a keyboard if you can show it to your site manager and they nod and say “OK” instead of “you’re fired.”

    • crtified 4 hours ago

      One is a keyboard.

      The other is a small self-contained computer with multiple airwave capabilities, some of its protections removed (rooting), all in an obsolete system (an old Android phone) which is itself a hive of vulnerabilities for anybody that gets access to it physical or digital.

      If that was brought into my workplace there'd be serious discussions.

      That is not a criticism of your creative work here, just an acknowledgement that a portion of workplaces would not take this lightly. Most who that applies to, should know, but it's still worth mentioning.

      • clickety_clack 3 hours ago

        I can’t imagine a workplace paranoid enough to have an air-gapped system, but chill enough to let people connect whatever they want to it.

  • clickety_clack 3 hours ago

    100% this. Like, not even a shadow of a hesitation.

mzajc 6 hours ago

> Nobody blocks a keyboard

Some of us do: https://usbguard.github.io/

  • mr-anjaneyam 6 hours ago

    True. USBGuard is linux specific. I was thinking more broadly about systems that don't have restrictions turned on by default. BIOS/UEFI and other OS have their own mechanisms though

minekaz3333 1 day ago

Except Qubes OS. It of course blocks USB keyboards by default. You can enable USB devices (filtered by device ID, USB controller/port, ...) if you want.

Even better: USB controllers are PCI-passed-through to dedicated (disposable) VM(s), so Linux kernel bugs don't expose your system to untrusted USB devices. Same with network devices, etc.

  • mr-anjaneyam 1 day ago

    Cool, I haven't heard of this default in Qubes. Plus, Emittr exposes itself as legitimate dell keyboard(configurable). So most of the non-paranoid devices can accept.

  • breakwaterlabs 4 hours ago

    > filtered by device ID

    This is of course a very weak protection, since a bad actor can MITM the real device.

    It is conceptually similar to sticky-MAC protections, except those raise a very loud alarm that requires admin intervention when the attacker goofs. I suspect you're not shutting down the USB port on rule violation.

Fe2O3 6 hours ago

> Placeholder. Actual demo soon

That's all I needed to see.

  • mr-anjaneyam 6 hours ago

    I recorded only a few scenarios. Didn't get enough time to edit. I'm planning to add by end of this week :)

luxuryballs 7 hours ago

hey don't tell! I opted against sharing my fun versions of this approach for a reason :)

  • mr-anjaneyam 6 hours ago

    Haha! Now you made me more curious. I'll take the hint though :)

alhadrad 3 hours ago

I take issue with this project unapologetically condoning and promoting wildly unethical use.