zenerdi0de 5 hours ago
  • ajasmin 5 hours ago

    > Write once, RCE everywhere

    lol

    • marginalia_nu 5 hours ago

      It's only on specific architectures though, so it kinda falls apart. It would be impressive if the bug was so portable it let you RCE on sub-AVX512 machines and ARM and whatever too. Maybe with the new vector API we'll see such portable vulnerabilities.

      • cpach 5 hours ago

        Sure, but X86 has an enormous market share though.

        • tptacek 5 hours ago

          Vulnerable platforms make up the overwhelming majority of all serverside Java applications.

          • marginalia_nu 5 hours ago

            At least on the AMD Epyc side you need a CPU that's no older than 2023 to be vulnerable. Naples, Rome and Milan are all AVX2-only.

            • tptacek 4 hours ago

              That's a good corrective, thank you!

  • iLoveOncall 5 hours ago

    What a horribly written and misleading article. They just make things up to make themselves look good, for example "Memory corruption is the most common class of vulnerability on the Internet". No the fuck it's not? SQL injections is BY FAR the most common class of vulnerability.

    This is a much much narrower issue than PHP2Shell.

    • tptacek 5 hours ago

      I like the idea that you're just going to sort of shout down Calif on a point like this. Have you looked at their roster lately?

      If you any part of your identity is based on the idea that firms like this aren't finding insane vulnerabilities right now, I think after they find the RCE in OpenJDK's core Base64 processing you're going to have to consider sucking it up, taking the L, and adjusting your priors.

      • cjbprime 4 hours ago

        The tone wasn't great, but hard to argue on the facts:

        ==

        Top 10 CWEs (2025 Ranking)

        Rank ID Weakness Name Score

        1 CWE-79 Cross-site Scripting (XSS) 60.38

        2 CWE-89 SQL Injection 28.72

        3 CWE-352 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 13.64

        4 CWE-862 Missing Authorization 13.28

        5 CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write 12.68

        • tptacek 4 hours ago

          On a simple count like that you could probably beat SQLI on "Javascript prototype pollution", too. But those are 5 classes of vulnerabilities with wildly different impacts, and platform-level SQLI is actually pretty rare.

          • iLoveOncall 3 hours ago

            Yeah move the goalpost. Calif.io employee I presume.

            • thephyber 3 hours ago

              Do you not know who tptacek is?

              He's pretty famous in cybersecurity and on HN as a poster.

              It's worth reading the text and the subtext of his comment.

              • tptacek 3 hours ago

                Not so much that I'm above criticism, I'm clearly not, so much as how funny it is to suggest "coworker of Thai Duong, Tavis Ormandy, Michal Zalewski, Dion Blazakis, and Stefan Esser" is a dunk. Shit, now I kind of do want to be a Calif.io employee.

                • thephyber 2 hours ago

                  I didn't mean to imply that you are above criticism.

                  More that you aren't just the average HN NPC and that your comments are usually high SNR and well informed.

              • ranger_danger 2 hours ago

                I have seen their comments across this site for a very long time. Unfortunately I do not respect or put any stock in what they say, because of how unbelievably rude and dogmatic they are, and always have been.

                "As a rule, strong feelings about issues do not emerge from deep understanding."

                • tptacek 2 hours ago

                  Well that hurts my feelings but also you're right: nobody should respect or put any stock into what I say because of my identity or status (whatever that might be).

          • cjbprime 3 hours ago

            Is "the most common class of vulnerability" not supposed to be measured by a simple count? It's the blog post's own plain language and it doesn't say anything about impact.

            • deathanatos 3 hours ago

              > Is "the most common class of vulnerability" not supposed to be measured by a simple count?

              Trivially yes? It'd be a rate of some ilk at least. Upthread, to their credit, was a "score" of undefined nature.

              But also, more upthread is talking about "memory corruption", which is going to include far more than just CWE-787. CWEs are a bit weird, and things I'd include in a loose colloquail definition like that would include stack based overflows, heap based overflows (which are for some reason different in CWE land), "classic buffer overflows" (CWE-120, again, their wording), out of bounds writes, OoB reads, null derefs, and use-after-free. All separate CWEs.

              • tptacek 3 hours ago

                It's just a category error comparison. SQLI is a web pest vulnerability†; memory corruption RCE is a vulnerability research vulnerability. They're different disciplines. Web SQLI vulnerabilities are usually application-code-specific (not just "application specific", but with a specific origin in a mistake made in application code). Big ticket vulnerability research publications are generally platform vulnerabilities; one specific coding mistake impacting thousands or millions of installs.

                It's very weird to look at a memory corruption RCE and say SQLI is "more common". On typical web targets, memory corruption RCE is basically unheard of (and SQLI is not the most common sev:hi vulnerability; SSRF probably outranks it).

                These are just vulnerability researchers talking like vulnerability researchers.

                Here's another way to put it: well over 90% of all vulnerabilities with a market value are rooted in memory corruption.

                † There are, of course, platform-level SQLI vulnerabilities; they're just quite rare.

            • ranger_danger 2 hours ago

              It sounds like there's more fundamentally a disagreement on what that phrase actually means to them in the first place.

              For example, one of many different ways of looking at this issue: perhaps by "...vulnerabilities on the Internet" they could have meant in reference to reported CVEs, or number/type of reported exploits being found in the wild, or not even something related to the Internet itself at all, like security issues found in local/desktop applications, among many other things. We just don't know.

              • cjbprime 2 hours ago

                > For example, one of many different ways of looking at this issue: perhaps by "...vulnerabilities on the Internet" they could have meant in reference to reported CVEs, [..]

                The CWE count is by reference to reported CVEs. If they meant that, they were wrong.

        • thephyber 3 hours ago

          I would argue the snapshot of 2025 CWE rankings isn't super helpful to resolve the argument here. It is an objective ranking, but it's missing a lot of context of how an OOB write is observed, reported and fixed.

          If an OOB write happens, it is likely to be investigated and solved quickly because the most likely symptoms are going to be memory corruption or a crash. These are super high impact symptoms.

          If an XSS or SQLi is present, there is not necessarily any symptom until some security researcher probes the code.

          The dichotomy allows for vastly more memory corruption issues to both be created and found+fixed early before there is a CVE reported for that product.

          What most people are missing here is that the article didn't need to restrict the memory corruption "to the internet". If you include all of the embedded devices that are not internet enabled and that run on C code, it's much more likely to be a true statement.

          Also, the pedantry in this thread is boring. If people actually bothered to understand the intent of what was being written rather than the imperfect communication, this thread wouldn't need to exist.

      • mitchweaver 4 hours ago

        > Have you looked at their roster lately?

        Yeah, aren't they the ones that jumped the gun on the PHP vuln and published their weird anime PoC video before the embargo expired?

        No one's questioning their technical abilities.

        Their communication skills are dogshit, however.

        • tptacek 4 hours ago

          I believe that was Chainguard, wasn't it?

          • what 47 minutes ago

            No.