black3r 1 day ago

The very first referenced issue in that PR discussion sheds a bit more light on this: https://github.com/adoptium/adoptium-support/issues/1480

This PR's author says there on October 1st: "Got an email from Oracle asking me to NOT proceed with a PR until receiving approval." and then on October 28th: "It's taken over by Oracle. Nothing required from us."

  • mzs 1 day ago

    should have known at this point it's a potential security issue and maybe the AI regurgitated this:

    https://github.com/adoptium/adoptium-support/issues/1480#iss...

    edit: also oracle is big enough to have one of every modern gen to test on

    • pixl97 1 day ago

      The proper way to deal with a security bug in any Oracle software is to zero day it.

      They are the biggest asshole of a company when it comes to anything, but especially security issues. They are one of the least friendly companies to security researchers and are likely to attack you with lawyers.

      Fuck Oracle. We should be putting them out of business.

      • malfist 1 day ago

        This is called throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

        • pixl97 1 day ago

          No, not really. This baby is rotten and infected with a corporate culture that looks to extract as much money out of you via any way possible, especially lawfare. If you're standing up with Oracle I need to point at the sign again.

          The sign: "Do not fall into the trap of anthropomorphizing Larry Ellison. Think of Larry Ellison the way you think of a lawn mower. You don't anthropomorphize your lawn mower. Your lawn mower just mows the lawn. You stick your hand in there, it'll chop it off, the end. You don't think "oh the lawn hates me!" the lawn mower doesn't give a shit about you. Your lawn mower can't hate you. Don't anthropomorphize the lawn mower. Don't fall into that trap about Oracle."

          • RIMR 1 day ago

            I really struggle to understand why anyone would trust a company that started as a CIA domestic surveillance project. The government's tentacles are deeply embedded in this company, which is partly why they feel so emboldened to engage in lawfare against anyone who might challenge them.

            • strictnein 17 hours ago

              > I really struggle to understand why anyone would trust a company that started as a CIA domestic surveillance project

              Because the company didn't start as a CIA domestic surveillance project? CIA project, yes. CIA "domestic surveillance" project, no. The CIA, like any large org at the time, needed a way to store large amounts of data in a usable form.

              It's weird how much this type of conspiratorial thinking has become commonplace here and in other tech discussions online. I'm not sure if there's just echo chambers people fall into where this is repeated enough that people assume it's true?

          • vips7L 22 hours ago

            I’ve been using Java for 15 years and Oracle has never gotten a cent from me. YMMV though.

            • KingOfCoders 15 hours ago

              You paying money is just one wrong click by any employee away. Then the Oracle Global Licensing and Advisory Services is on you with an audit. And then you hire a consultant from the Oracle license consultant industry to help you through.

        • easterncalculus 1 day ago

          There is no baby. This is throwing out the squatter in your basement.

          • malfist 1 day ago

            I'm sure all the people compromised by a zeroday in java think they're a squatter in your basement.

        • tejtm 1 day ago

          sometimes Darwin solutions are the best solutions

          • pixl97 1 day ago

            Yesterday on a post I was stating that Responsible Disclosure has been the worst thing for computing ever. It has lulled humanity into the idea that computers are safe and we've built just massive amounts of digital infrastructure under that delusion.

            If every bug was a zero day then we'd have never hooked things like water grids and electrical grids to networks. Grocery stores and bloodbanks would have never put freezers on the internet. Along with a million other huge security risks, too many to be named here.

            The AI age has exposed that stupidity.

            • malfist 1 day ago

              That's just not true. People don't hook up freezers to the internet because they think it's safe, they do it because it's cheap and convenient, and saves having to send someone out to manually check them every X hours. The free market doesn't reward more than legally minimum safety requirements.

              • josnyder 1 day ago

                Your view can be harmonized with your parent comment's view.

                Capitalism rewards all sorts of safety requirements, if they become visible to a balance sheet within a reasonable period of time. Just look at marine insurance in the middle east right now.

                The status quo is that IoT freezers are massively inconvenient every decade or so. Businesses can live out an entire lifecycle in this period of time, without the risk ever hitting their balance sheet.

                pixl97 is saying: what if we made the risk far more common, so that its effect shows up on a balance sheet within 6-12 months?

                • smuhakg 18 hours ago

                  > pixl97 is saying: what if we made the risk far more common, so that its effect shows up on a balance sheet within 6-12 months?

                  What is the purpose of this? It's just intentionally making hacks more common and a net negative for the economy.

                  More secure systems aren't inherently good. You don't hear people talking about how happy they are that break-ins are common and everyone locks their doors before leaving the house.

                  • pixl97 17 hours ago

                    >More secure systems aren't inherently good.

                    I'm sorry buddy, but you were born in the wrong universe not to defend yourself.

                    The internet is a global network. This means people not under your sovereign jurisdiction can reach out and fuck with your data and you can do jack shit about it unless you want to take a bunch of other really expensive actions (for example economic or hot warfare).

                    Computer people should know better than thinking that the internet is anything other than an inherently hostile place. Groups we consider enemy nations share the same web space. Countries that make $1000 a year share the same web space, and all the juicy servers you leave insecure look like a very good way for them to become absolutely rich. Hell, even people in your own country are apt to get away with hacking with a little bit of skill.

                    The internet is not your neighborhood. You can't call the police to fix every little issue for you. It is a literal war zone, just most people are still in denial about that.

                    Now start treating it like that.

              • po1nt 22 hours ago

                Because of the daddy state safety net, people are not risk aware. If they suffer the consequences they can always push for more state control in the spirit of "why did you let me do this". Whole prohibition stood on this idea.

                • malfist 17 hours ago

                  What a ridiculous assertion. Do you go around sticking every small object in your mouth just because it doesn't have a sticker about chocking hazards?

                • jodrellblank 6 hours ago

                  The two most common causes of child death in the USA are parents running over their own children in their cars, and guns.

                  Please feel free to explain how people are not aware of the danger of running over their own children because of the daddy state, and how fun owners have somehow missed the dangers of guns.

                  The consequences are usually suffered by other people. You speed, other people die in the resulting crash. You get the freedom to make unsafe buildings and furniture and electrical goods for profit, other people die from them collapsing and burning down.

                  • ZephyrP 9 minutes ago

                    Querying wonder.cdc.gov directly produces data that the above conversation doesn't capture.

                      DATASET
                        Underlying Cause of Death, 2018-2024
                      CONDITIONS:
                        age >= 1 AND age <= 14 GROUP BY 'ICD-10 113 Cause List'
                    
                      +----------------------------------------------------------------------+------+-----------+---------------+
                      | ICD-10 113 Cause List                                                |Deaths|Population |95% CI Crude   |
                      +----------------------------------------------------------------------+------+-----------+---------------+
                      | #Accidents (unintentional injuries) (V01-X59,Y85-Y86)                |19,632|395,072,266|5.0 (4.9 - 5.0)|
                      |   Nontransport accidents (W00-X59,Y86)                               |10,596|395,072,266|2.7 (2.6 - 2.7)|
                      |   Transport accidents (V01-V99,Y85)                                  | 9,036|395,072,266|2.3 (2.2 - 2.3)|
                      |   Motor vehicle accidents (V02-V89...)                               | 8,550|395,072,266|2.2 (2.1 - 2.2)|
                      | All other diseases (Residual)                                        | 8,151|395,072,266|2.1 (2.0 - 2.1)|
                      | #Malignant neoplasms (C00-C97)                                       | 7,750|395,072,266|2.0 (1.9 - 2.0)|
                      | #Congenital malformations, deformations & chromosomal abn. (Q00-Q99) | 5,564|395,072,266|1.4 (1.4 - 1.4)|
                      | #Assault (homicide) (*U01-*U02,X85-Y09,Y87.1)                        | 5,225|395,072,266|1.3 (1.3 - 1.4)|
                      | Accidental drowning and submersion (W65-W74)                         | 4,700|395,072,266|1.2 (1.2 - 1.2)|
                      | #Intentional self-harm (suicide) (*U03,X60-X84,Y87.0)                | 3,839|395,072,266|1.0 (0.9 - 1.0)|
                      | Major cardiovascular diseases (I00-I78)                              | 3,271|395,072,266|0.8 (0.8 - 0.9)|
                      | Other & unspec. nontransport accidents & sequelae (W20-Y86...)       | 2,717|395,072,266|0.7 (0.7 - 0.7)|
                      | Symptoms, signs & abnormal clin./lab findings, NEC (R00-R99)         | 2,658|395,072,266|0.7 (0.6 - 0.7)|
                      | Malignant neoplasms of meninges, brain & other CNS (C70-C72)         | 2,650|395,072,266|0.7 (0.6 - 0.7)|
                      | Assault (homicide) by other/unspec. means & sequelae (*U01-Y87.1...) | 2,625|395,072,266|0.7 (0.6 - 0.7)|
                      | Assault (homicide) by discharge of firearms (*U01.4,X93-X95)         | 2,600|395,072,266|0.7 (0.6 - 0.7)|
                      | Intentional self-harm (suicide) by other/unspec. means (*U03-Y87.0)  | 2,452|395,072,266|0.6 (0.6 - 0.6)|
                      | All other & unspec. malignant neoplasms (C17-C97...)                 | 2,435|395,072,266|0.6 (0.6 - 0.6)|
                      | Other & unspec. infectious/parasitic diseases & sequelae (A00-U07.1) | 2,177|395,072,266|0.6 (0.5 - 0.6)|
                      +----------------------------------------------------------------------+------+-----------+---------------+
              • hobo123 15 hours ago

                You know VPNs exist, right? Nobody has to hook their devices/freezers into the OPEN Internet.

                • happymellon 8 hours ago

                  Hell, what about the raspberry pi that logs all the temperatures and forwards them to the central supermarket logging system.

                  Why is there not a proxy so we don't need to expose the refrigerators to even a VPN?

              • somenameforme 12 hours ago

                I don't think this is the issue. Freezers are extremely reliable. They're built to operate 24 hours a day for years on end. They're also designed to maintain approximate temperature (when full) for about 2 days, so even a freak outage isn't that big a deal.

                There's no real problem being solved. People just went that direction to follow trend of 'smart' everything because it's cheap, you can concoct hypothetical scenarios where it might be useful for marketing (regardless of whether or not they're at all realistic), and most importantly of all - complete lack of awareness about the risks involved.

                • mschuster91 10 hours ago

                  > There's no real problem being solved.

                  There actually is. Humans are notoriously sloppy in following mundane, boring compliance bullshit tasks, and noting down freezer temperatures is what I'd say very high up on the list of bullshit tasks that are so pointless they're demeaning to the human who has to be the eyes for the machine.

                  Connecting the freezers to a central logging facility now needs no human checking the freezer every hour and writing down the temperature on a sheet of paper no one will ever read. It is precisely what machines are made for. And since compliance is now automatic instead of a strong incentive for the human to just invent "valid" data and be done, actual outages can now be spotted much faster.

                  • somenameforme 8 hours ago

                    Again for normal usage this is not a very realistic scenario. Freezers generally keep relatively near to their target temperatures, when full, for about 48 hours. A grocery store or something might have it as part of a routine maintenance schedule alongside bathrooms, trash bins, etc but this is hardly some problem that needs solving, especially not if one is aware of the risks.

              • RobotToaster 12 hours ago

                > People don't hook up freezers to the internet because they think it's safe

                I don't think that's true.

                They may have known there was a risk, but historically it was small. If they knew it was certain to be hacked before next Thursday most would stop doing it pretty quickly.

                It's like driving. Every time you drive there's a small chance of an accident, but everyone still does it. If there was a 50% chance of death most would stop doing it pretty quickly.

            • aftbit 21 hours ago

              Securely networking electrical grids offers improvements in reliability, which translates directly to safety. If the power goes off on a hot summer afternoon, people die. Networking enables faults to be detected and resolved faster, reducing the amount of time that the system stays in dangerous conditions.

              Similarly, (securely) networking water treatment plants enables people to remotely verify that settings are where they're supposed to be and adjust them to match changing sample reports or intake conditions, reducing the risk of over-treating or under-treating the water, both of which can have safety consequences.

              On top of that, networking enables much greater efficiency. Rather than having a person sitting at every substation ready to throw a breaker, or more likely, ready to drive there (taking time), you can have them sitting in a control room that monitors the whole grid at once.

              Much of modern life would be much more expensive and much less safe without networking.

              We really shouldn't throw the baby out with the bathwater. It is possible to build secure systems. It takes a certain degree of paranoia and dedication that humans find difficult, and a willingness and ability to respond quickly to unknown threats, but that doesn't make it impossible.

              • pixl97 21 hours ago

                >Much of modern life would be much more expensive and much less safe without networking.

                The modern world wouldn't work without gasoline, but it's burning the planet to the ground in the meantime.

                If your efficiency is gained by taking the brakes off the car to make it lighter you're going to realize how bad you screwed up when it comes time to stop.

                We've been playing a 30 year game of fucking around and we're reached find out time.

                If we want to build secure systems we're going to have to flush about 95% of the programmers out there.

                • aftbit 20 hours ago

                  On the other hand, we wouldn't have gotten to fiber and 5G without spending some time on copper wires first.

                  I agree about one thing - incentives cannot work properly if it takes you 30 years to find out but your economy is built on 3 month business cycles.

                  We don't need to flush 95% of the programmers (though that is probably happening anyway). We need to flush 95% of the incentives to go fast and avoid spending money. Fast, cheap, or good - if you're very lucky and very good, you can squeeze two of them out of the equation. Most of the time, you're lucky to get even one.

    • pron 19 hours ago

      We did know it was a potential security risk, and that is why it was handled exactly how security-sensitive issues are supposed to be handled (not to mention that the reporter is a well-respected OpenJDK contributor and former Oracle colleague).

      I don't know if people here understand how these things need to be done in the most important and critical open source projects, such as Linux or OpenJDK, but there are two things you must not do when an issue is suspected to be a risk until you've researched the matter and decided on a backport and release strategy: You shouldn't communicate publicly, and you absolutely shouldn't merge a patch.

      • bawolff 18 hours ago

        Well i understand where this view comes from, sometimes it can feel like its a net negative for security in the end.

        Full disclosure might cause short term panic, but it does get things fixed quickly.

        • pron 18 hours ago

          When your product runs the world, you need to coordinate exactly how a patch is released across multiple versions and when, and you don't want to tip your hand before everything is ready. A lot is riding on doing this right.

      • guiambros 17 hours ago

        > You shouldn't communicate publicly, and you absolutely shouldn't merge a patch.

        I (still) agree, but I don't think these rules will be valid for much longer, though.

        With new models capable of finding vulnerabilities faster than ever before, if you (or your AI) was able to find a critical bug, it's only a matter of time that the bad guys will also discover it - if they haven't already.

        Human skill and ingenuity used to be the limiting factor, so it was the universal equalizer. Now the game depends on how many tokens you want to throw at the problem, and there are many bad actors with incentives to outspend every white hacker out there.

        Responsible disclosure will still be important, of course, but timelines will need to be compressed into days, instead of months.

        • aljgz 16 hours ago

          This still does not change how security critical bugs should be handled.

          It's expected that the ability to run models follows a power law distribution: very few actors are able to run the most expensive models on many codebases/binaries, spending lots of tokens on each project.

          Disclosing a serious vulnerability potentially exposes it to orders of magnitude more people.

        • bostik 15 hours ago

          There is case to be made that with the LLM-powered vulnerability research any bug found with the help of an LLM should be considered public.

          If I spent N tokens to find a specific funky bug, you should expect others to have done the same. In a way, in this modern age the full-disclosure guys had it right all along. Reality caught up with a three decade lag.

        • hobo123 15 hours ago

          Also, for something that you could just deactivate, it's absolutely unacceptable for Oracle to take so long. Deactivating the intrinsic would have been a few-line patch that they could have easily ported to all branches and then communicated to other vendors. Shouldn't have taken more than 2 days to fix.

          Shit like this is what forces people to just _merge_ fixes, why shouldn't they?

          • pron 6 hours ago

            That would be irresponsible. A vulnerability isn't closed once you merge a fix, and not once you release builds. It's closed when users apply the patch in production. That takes time no matter how quickly you release, and could come at the expense of other things your users may want to do, including addressing other vulnerabilities. Turning a bug into an exploit can also take time, even with the help of AI.

            So until you know how dangerous the bug is and have a plan for release (does it go in the next quarterly patch, which users are ready for, or are you making a special release?) you shouldn't do anything public because you don't yet know what to advise your users to do.

  • znpy 22 hours ago

    I’m usually a java supporter because i have fond memories of working with it and great experiences from working with high throughput/low latency stuff written in java… HOWEVER: I’ll frame that comment as a smoking gun the next time somebody says java is fully independent from oracle (btw this used to also be me, but i clearly have to change my position)

    • aftbit 21 hours ago

      Java fully independent from Oracle? Who would think that? The OpenJDK is mostly paid for by Oracle and Red Hat. Control always follows money.

dlor 19 hours ago

I also found this independently ahead of disclosure and reported it to Oracle last Friday. My harness found it after a fuzzing run and then turned it into a full RCE chain in the target app I was actually scanning.

The harness itself doesn't run with Internet access and I confirmed it didn't access this PR directly, but who knows if this was in the training set itself.

Either way, these simultaneous disclosures are incredibly common now. The Ruby issue affecting Gitlab was not only known about for 6 months, it was publicly fixed for 6 months before someone turned it into an RCE. The fix sat on the Ruby dev branch, and it was never pulled into an actual Ruby release until after Gitlab disclosed their own 10.0 vulnerability through it.

It's very common for reporters to not realize the impact of a bug, models are very good at turning bugs into RCE chains, and the volume everywhere now means security teams are basically only focused on RCEs.

  • AlexCoventry 19 hours ago

    Which model were you using?

    • dlor 17 hours ago

      Mythos 5.2

  • dannyw 8 hours ago

    Even without internet access; nearly all harnesses provide the current date, often early on in the system prompt.

    I’m curious if there’s been much study into long-horizon behavior depending on the date? Probably unlikely, but the sheer volume of simultaneous discoverers just feels… weird.

    That said, it’s probably more likely a lot of these have actually been discovered during large scale RL rollouts.

    The sheer volume and scale is just massive, many reports are false positives; there’s zero chance someone at Anthropic/OpenAI is actually going through run 02947 with XXX billion tokens and seeing which discoveries are real.

wood_spirit 1 day ago

So the implication is that the LLM that assisted the Calif researchers might have read this previous bug report and not independently discovered it?

  • cryptonector 1 day ago

    Idk that u/notmine1337 meant that. I have questions:

    - why was this not a secure vulnerability report, why was it public?

    - why was this closed [by the submitter]?

    For the second question, I suspect it's because they were told a different fix was coming.

    • jakewins 1 day ago

      Why it was closed, surely, was because the only reaction to the PR was a bot saying it will automatically close the PR soon because of inactivity?

      I know I have opened a lot of PRs where the only result is I get bot spam in my email and no project reaction, so I close the PR to stop the bot spam; if nobody from Oracle has reacted in 2 months it seems unlikely anyone will.

      Nowadays I’ve stopped opening “cold-call” PRs like this. I find a way to chat with a maintainer first and anchor what I want to do (“I hit this bug, would you take a PR to fix it? I was thinking it could be solved by x, would that work?”

      Much much better outcomes that way.

      • eru 1 day ago

        Though in the age of LLM, I really wonder what the benefit of asking for permission to make a PR is? It's not like you are wasting much effort, if they don't want it. And if they do want it, the PR is right there, instead of waiting for another round-trip.

        • ApolloFortyNine 1 day ago

          Yea I've let claude make a couple PRs when it's clearly a bug in the repo, if the maintainer wants to take a stand against AI PRs so be it, my local copy has the fix.

        • ajasmin 1 day ago

          There may still be an incline to give the PR’s fix strategy a “fair chance” and feel obliged to comb through it, which if the change is somewhat intricate can present a bigger hump to get through.

    • philipwhiuk 1 day ago

      > why was this not a secure vulnerability report, why was it public?

      Because it was seen as a crash not an RCE. AI's power has been chaining simple crashes into exploits. But that's not generally going to be true.

      • wat10000 1 day ago

        I'd be surprised if that's what happened. The instant I see "corrupting the heap" I assume it's a serious vulnerability unless proven otherwise. AI is taking it to another level, but the days of dismissing memory corruption as unexploitable died years before.

        • eru 1 day ago

          Yes, even before LLMs it was a common heuristic that if you can make something crash, with a bit more cleverness you can usually take over.

        • pron 1 day ago

          That is precisely why it wasn't dismissed and why there were no public activity on this issue.

  • dlenski 1 day ago

    I don't think that's a reasonable implication at all.

    There are lots of bugs in lots of software, and lots of them get ignored when reported.

    I personally aware of multiple security vulnerabilities in major pieces of software that everyone has heard of, which I very quickly and easily stumbled on while working on this software as an AWS engineer several years ago. I had never used an LLM of any kind at the time.

    I presented my findings both internally and externally, and the reactions ranged from shrugs to delays to hostility towards me for "getting distracted" or "being overly negative."

    Those bugs that I discovered still exist, last time I checked.

    • ajasmin 1 day ago

      Minimum Secure Product -> Ship it to prod.

    • larodi 23 hours ago

      > I don't think that's a reasonable implication at all.

      the contrary is very likely thing the agent may have done, given they... like agents dig the web, don't they. and if im a security researcher digging through Oracle's shit, the open issues sure does look a good starting point.

darkamaul 1 day ago

We will never know, but there is a chance that the Calif's researcher model decided to look at the open and closed issues / PRs of the repo.

Nonetheless, being able to understand the criticality of a finding, and how to exploit it are other skills, that still require supervision.

  • eru 1 day ago

    > We will never know, but there is a chance that the Calif's researcher model decided to look at the open and closed issues / PRs of the repo.

    I often do this when looking for low hanging fruit. A lot of the time you find half-abandoned PRs when the original author ran out of damns to give.

  • dannyw 7 hours ago

    You’d be silly and wasting tokens (and your time) to not download a feed/archive of PRs/issues with words like “crash” and “overflow” and drop it inside a folder in your sandbox.

elashri 1 day ago

This person is a member of OpenJDK organization and a contributer but not sure if he is oracle employee.

  • egorfine 1 day ago

    None of this did help: nobody gave a flying f.

    • bobmcnamara 1 day ago

      Someone probably gave a maintainer "the talk"

    • pron 1 day ago

      There were no public comments precisely because it was immediately identified as a potential security risk! The JDK is so critical and sensitive (probably the most important open source project after Linux) that we have policies that are more carefully considered than your average open source project (including most language compiler/runtime projects). We can allow no public comments and no public merges of code on anything that could be a security risk before the security research team studies it.

      • karianna 23 hours ago

        ^^This. Same policy was applied at Adoptium once we realised what it might entail. Oracle did the right thing here in my estimation

        • hobo123 14 hours ago

          Right thing would have been disabling the fast path intrinsic and releasing that right away, with a CVE.

          • pron 6 hours ago

            That would be the wrong thing to do. You don't know how severe the problem is and what to advise your users. Important products like this have regular quarterly updates, where the less risky vulnerabilities are patched. You can't just cut an emergency release that your users may not be prepared to apply before you know what the risk is.

      • Phelinofist 23 hours ago

        So reports without any activity are the juicy stuff? Got it /s

      • pamcake 17 hours ago

        That's all good by itself. However, in my view the original PR on September 9 should be seen as a public disclosure in itself. When a security vulnerability becomes public like this (regardless of why or by whom), that should have impact on timeline for fix, and maybe also communications. The cat's out of the bag already and no amount of silence will put it back in.

        A lot of similar aspects to the "PHP embargo was broken" deal the other week.

        For the same reasons you give, there is a different level of pressure on timelines and responsiveness, too, for a project like OpenJDK. I don't think 1 month is reasonable timeline for a publicly known vulnerability like this.

        • pron 1 hour ago

          > When a security vulnerability becomes public like this (regardless of why or by whom), that should have impact on timeline for fix, and maybe also communications. The cat's out of the bag already and no amount of silence will put it back in.

          Not all vulnerabilities are created equal, and they don't all justify an emergency release (the JDK has regular quarterly releases for security patches). Until you know the impact, disrupting your users is not the best path to security (just as you don't want to police to respond to every suspicious occurrence).

          > I don't think 1 month is reasonable timeline for a publicly known vulnerability like this.

          It wasn't a publicly known vulnerability; it was a publicly known bug. If the original reporter had thought this to be a vulnerability he wouldn't have reported it like that (he's a former colleague who's familiar with project policies).

      • staplehorse6553 12 hours ago

        >probably the most important open source project after Linux

        That's a wild thing to say about my Minecraft server, but I appreciate the concern!

rzmmm 1 day ago

From califio: "I focused the audit on the JIT compiler, intrinsics, widely accessible APIs, and cryptography. Well, more precisely, I told Codex to look at those areas like any serious security researcher in 2026."

Maybe simply a coincidence, but I would put my bets that the first person with the PR was also using Codex, and the model was exposed to the details of the bug.

  • rfgplk 1 day ago

    > From califio: "I focused the audit on the JIT compiler, intrinsics, widely accessible APIs, and cryptography. Well, more precisely, I told Codex to look at those areas like any serious security researcher in 2026."

    I have no idea why people keep talking like this. Probably because sadly most engineers lack the ego to back themselves up. Imagine if someone said this in 2015: "I worked on the physics engine, tests, via widely accessible libraries. Well, more precisely, I told my compiler to read the source code and compile it like any serious software engineer in 2026."

    Quit saying Codex/Claude/an LLM did something. They didn't. You did.

    • NooneAtAll5 1 day ago

      no, it's more like "I worked on physics engine. Well, more precisely, I used already made library and never even looked at actual physics"

    • p-e-w 1 day ago

      A frontier AI is nothing like a compiler. The litmus test is how much expertise was required to get it to find the results. If a basic prompt brings up an industry-shaking vulnerability of this caliber, then the human was at best a janitor.

      • Izkata 1 day ago

        For me it's whether or not they've started committing prompts instead of code.

    • LoganDark 1 day ago

      > Quit saying Codex/Claude/an LLM did something. They didn't. You did.

      I think there's a vast difference between giving source code to a compiler (even a superoptimizing compiler) and giving a prompt to a language model. This distinction absolutely deserves to be called out and not swept under the rug. It doesn't make you any less responsible for what you submit, but it's courteous to your reviewers to be transparent.

    • xmodem 1 day ago

      "I worked on the physics engine, tests, via widely accessible libraries." is a nonsensical sentence as written, but a colleague who told me they had done this would be telling me a vastly different thing to if they had told me they had compiled the source code to a physics engine.

      There is a massive difference between prompting "security audit this codebase, make no mistakes", performing an in-depth agent or LLM-assisted focused search for security relevant code, or otherwise manually reviewing code as we did in the pre-LLM era. It behooves us to be honest about our own personal contribution to our output - both towards others and to ourselves.

      • tkz1312 1 day ago

        I don't disagree with you necessarily, and I do think it a good practice to disclose how much of a contribution was llm generated, but regarding the difference an individual makes, I see a huge gap between different colleagues in how well they are able to use llms and the quality of the results they are able to produce with them, so I am increasingly inclined to view them as something closer to a compiler or SMT solver than a contributor in of themselves.

        • boie0025 1 day ago

          I am also finding this disparity. I hand off the agent skills I use daily, to produce the results I want in the way I want them, to some people and I still get poor results, and others I get good results. There's something about a combination of tools, prompting and FTGs about the outcomes that combine into these different results. I should imagine at some point that will disappear?

          • tkz1312 10 hours ago

            why should it disappear? afaict llms seem to be an accelerant, skilled engineers with a good grasp of how to use then fly, mediocre ones, or ones who haven't yet figured out workflows that mesh with their style kinda just chug along at their same old pace.

    • wat10000 1 day ago

      Is it really fair to say that I did something when my contribution was typing straightforward English prose for thirty seconds and then letting it run?

      Your hypothetical makes the opposite point from what you intend. If someone in 2015 said that they worked on a physics engine, and all they did was run the compiler on existing code, we'd laugh them out of the room. Pointing an existing computer program at existing work doesn't count as doing very much.

    • ShinyLeftPad 1 day ago

      It's an honest disclaimer of jerk behavior "i didn't care to review it carefully, you do it".

      Because when people really spend the effort required to fully review and own the result, somehow they don't have a problem of pointing at models.

InsidiousWombat 1 day ago

Nice proof that the auto-close bots are literal cancer on project that make stuff worse.

It was literal bug with provided fix. All it needed is someone to have a proper look.

But someone clowned a bot under a visionary thought "if nobody looked it must not be important" and here we are

  • stickfigure 1 day ago

    Agreed, but in this case it looks like the submitter closed it? What's that about?

    • dboreham 1 day ago

      They knew about the fix coming?

      • cryptonector 1 day ago

        That's my guess. But also opening a public issue was a faux pas.

        • philipwhiuk 1 day ago

          At the time maybe he assumed it was just a crash.

          • cryptonector 1 day ago

            From the report:

            > The stub stores past the logical output length before returning to Java, corrupting the heap.

            It was obviously a security vulnerability. That the project didn't immediately re-write then close the PR and admonish submitter is astounding.

            • dpkirchner 1 day ago

              Given they (those best able to understand the significance of the crash) didn't consider the bug worth fixing, I'm not sure why they'd admonish the submitter. Or why submitters in the future should act more carefully.

              The takeaway from this is not "the submitter was wrong", it's "we need to move off of openjdk yesterday".

              • cryptonector 1 day ago

                Assumes facts not in evidence. We do not know that the maintainers "didn't consider the bug worth fixing". And yes, submitters should "act more carefully" when they know they are reporting a vulnerability.

                • dpkirchner 22 hours ago

                  The segfault was reported several months ago (see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50562104). If the submitter went through project zero we'd be well past the 90 day window. How is that not sufficient evidence?

                  • cryptonector 16 hours ago

                    > The segfault was reported several months ago (see https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50562104).

                    Did OpenJDK fix the bug only when Java4shell came out, or did they have a fix in progress? Gemini and Claude tell me the fix had already been in the works. Therefore your earlier:

                    > > > Given they (those best able to understand the significance of the crash) didn't consider the bug worth fixing,

                    is false, and indeed that was 'facts not in evidence'.

                    > If the submitter went through project zero we'd be well past the 90 day window. How is that not sufficient evidence?

                    There is no evidence of "they [...] didn't consider the bug worth fixing". On the contrary, there is evidence that they did consider it worth fixing.

        • dlenski 1 day ago

          > But also opening a public issue was a faux pas.

          Sorry, but why?

          Why should someone discovering a bug in an enormously complex piece of software have any responsibility for assessing the security implications of that bug?

          If the maintainers wanted to make it private they could have done so.

          • cryptonector 1 day ago

            Submitter wrote:

            > The stub stores past the logical output length before returning to Java, corrupting the heap.

            That's obviously a security vulnerability. If they didn't understand that, how did they even find it?

    • pimterry 1 day ago

      They closed themselves immediately after the stale bot pinged to say it was going to be closed automatically. If you're not that investigated in a PR for a niche corruption bug, you open it and nobody responds for two months, when you get notified about it it's pretty reasonable to just close and move on. Perfectly normal OSS contributor behaviour imo (especially in this new world where every project is drowning under AI contributions, and struggling to stay responsive).

      • toast0 1 day ago

        > you open it and nobody responds for two months, when you get notified about it it's pretty reasonable to just close and move on.

        Why invest more time to close it? The automation will do it for you.

        In this case, there's evidence from a linked issue that Oracle was in communication with the author outside the PR. When you get a ping, and you know it's being worked on outside the PR, it does make sense to close it, cause you know it's being resolved elsewhere.

        • eviks 1 day ago

          For example, not to get another useless notification from a bot later

  • bombcar 1 day ago

    Grab a billion tokens and farm auto-closed GitHub issues. Become HN famous for a day.

  • cryptonector 1 day ago

    It wasn't auto-closed.

    • lol768 1 day ago

      Doesn't matter, it was about to be.

      • cryptonector 23 hours ago

        We don't know that.

        If I were the relevant maintainer I would have reached out to submitter privately and asked them to hold off more widely reporting this, and I would not have stopped the bot from announcing impending closure.

  • dboreham 1 day ago

    A project with auto bug close signals to me that it is badly managed and hence should be used with caution.

    • lol768 1 day ago

      Completely agree with this. At some point I want to make a side-project that you can run that auto-comments on tickets to keep them alive.

  • frangonf 1 day ago

    Even Duke gave up on the current state of software.

    Would it be better to have some Oracle gpus running the dukebot? Are the robobun and friends better at real triage/escalation? Could we automate the robobots to register the `java2root.com` domain on its own, release a blog post and post it in twitter/hn upon every successful security issue?

  • wat10000 1 day ago

    The bot auto-closes issues that have been inactive for 16 weeks. The CVE was published at about 10 weeks in. The auto-close bot was completely irrelevant to this. The issue wasn't that it got auto-closed (it didn't) but that nobody from the project looked at the PR. That's a hard problem to solve, because any big project has a lot of volume and it's easy to miss things. It's unfortunate but a fact of life that you can't just toss up a PR and expect anyone to automatically look at it.

    • fn-mote 1 day ago

      > you can't just toss up a PR and expect anyone to automatically look at it.

      Except soon you can expect LLM triage to be standard.

      We would then find out if enough tokens would be invested in this one to figure out it was important, but any look is better than none.

      I actually think the suggestion in the PR should have been auto accepted by an LLM.

  • pron 1 day ago

    I work on the JDK, and while I have no involvement with this issue, knowing how we work, what has likely happened is quite the opposite. Bugs don't slip through our triage, and every bug that leads to a VM crash, especially in the compiler backend, is flagged for security review by the security research team; once that happens, no public communication is done. I don't know this is what happened here, but it is the most likely thing to have happened.

    We're not talking any large open source project here. We're talking about a project that, like Linux, runs much of the world's software infrastructure, and even bugs that could potentially be vulnerabilities need to be handled with great care.

    • ShinyLeftPad 1 day ago

      Should jdk security team have wiped the PR then, if they noticed it? since it leaked a 0day

      • pron 1 day ago

        Because it runs so much of the world's most important software, the JDK is heavily watched, and removing a PR would only draw attention to it.

        Also, it's not really a leaked 0-day because there's ways to go from a bug to an exploit (even going from Calif's detailed public report to an exploit is not trivial, because exploits depend on the particular application; there has been no disclosed exploit that requires only the JDK).

        • HappyDreamer 21 hours ago

          Thanks for explaining!

          I'm guessing Oracle won't get back to the person later and say "thanks now fixed was actually a high sev vuln" (I can understand if everyone is short of time and can't keep track of such things?)

          • pron 19 hours ago

            He's listed as the fix's co-author (and he's a friend; he's a regular contributor and a former Oracle employee).

fulafel 1 day ago

It's even titled buffer overflow.

yread 1 day ago

They even used the same example as Calif: AAA....A=.

  • Alifatisk 1 day ago

    Using As when fiddling with the memory is common. Nothing unique to Calif.

    • gruez 1 day ago

      Not to mention it's the first letter in the base64 alphabet, so if you want a bunch of zeroes, that's how you get it.

      • echoangle 1 day ago

        Today I learned that the Base64 Alphabet doesn't start with the numbers so A is 0 And 0 is 52.

    • layer8 1 day ago

      Except that in Base64 it’s not the alternating bit pattern of hex A (binary 0101), which is the property one uses it for in memory, but instead decodes to all-zeros (and is binary 01000001 in ASCII before decoding).

    • rustyhancock 1 day ago

      Yes, especially in past decades when it's easy to spot 41414141 on the stack in a debugger.

      You might follow up with a De Bruijn/cyclic pattern and can see the overflow happen by step1 and precisely locate it by what replaces the A's.

      https://youtu.be/L2j90atBpRU?is=q6W_1eF4viMoKZEA

      Didn't the Alpine Linux bug also use A's for the exploit to login as root?

badgersnake 1 day ago

Much easier to scrape the closed PRs with your LLM than actually do proper analysis I guess.

Although maybe they didn’t even know their LLM was doing this.

stevefan1999 10 hours ago

Sigh. We are getting less secure in the age of AI due to bureaucracy. I'm tired to patch it one by one, please unleash hell on earth for me to end this once and for all

panny 11 hours ago

>AI regurgitates another human solution

lol

lmao even